

Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation

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Contents

Preface v

Abbreviations, acronyms, units and conversions xxiii

PART I INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter 1. Fuel cycles 11

Paper 1. An evolutionary strategy for nuclear power 11

 I. Introduction 11

 II. Latent proliferation 14

 III. Isotopically denatured fuel cycles 15

 IV. Uranium efficiency 20

 V. Economics 23

 VI. A high nuclear growth scenario 29

 VII. Uranium prices 33

 VIII. A timetable for the USA 35

 IX. Nuclear energy for the world 38

 X. Summary 40

Appendix 1A. Assumptions used in the economic calculations 45

Chapter 2. Enrichment 49

Paper 2. Practical suggestions for the improvement of proliferation resistance within the enriched uranium fuel cycle 49

 I. Introduction 49

 II. Chemical enrichment 49

 III. Enriched uranium fuels 53

Paper 3. Jet nozzle and vortex tube enrichment technologies 61

 I. Introduction 61

vii

II. The technologies	61
III. Problems of proliferation of enrichment technologies and facilities	67
IV. Conclusions	69
Paper 4. Laser separation of isotopes	73
I. Basic requirements and classification of methods	73
II. Results for light elements	78
III. Results for heavy elements	81
IV. Open problems, future prospects	87
 <i>Chapter 3. Reprocessing</i>	 91
Paper 5. Proliferation risks associated with different back-end fuel cycles for light water reactors	91
I. Introduction	91
II. The problem of defining proliferation risk levels	92
III. Common assumptions	93
IV. The reprocessing route	94
V. The once-through cycle	97
VI. Summary and conclusions	101
 <i>Chapter 4. Waste disposal</i>	 105
Paper 6. Reprocessing and waste management	105
I. Introduction	105
II. Is reprocessing necessary from a waste management standpoint?	105
III. Reprocessing would not simplify waste management	106
IV. Conclusions	110
 <i>Chapter 5. Physical barriers to proliferation</i>	 113
Paper 7. Can plutonium be made weapon-proof?	113
 PART II INTRODUCTION	 121
 <i>Chapter 6. Breeders</i>	 127
Paper 8. The proliferation aspects of breeder deployment	127
I. Background	127
II. Why the breeder?	128
III. The uranium cycle versus the plutonium cycle	132
IV. How to strengthen the 'weak points' in the plutonium cycle ..	135
V. Conclusion	139

Paper 9. The role of the breeder reactor	141
I. Background	141
II. Types of nuclear weapon proliferation	141
III. Breeder fundamentals	142
IV. The proper role of the breeder reactor	145
V. What to do?	147
VI. Conclusion	152
 Chapter 7. Hybrid reactors	155
 Paper 10. Fusion–fission hybrid reactors	155
I. Nuclear fuel supply problems	155
II. Hybrid reactors	157
 Paper 11. Laser fusion and fusion hybrid breeders: proliferation implications	161
I. Introduction: energy in the very long term	161
II. Fusion as a process	161
III. Fusion–fission hybrid: fissile material production	167
IV. The question of knowledge and technology	171
V. Conclusion	171
 PART III INTRODUCTION	173
 Chapter 8. Safeguards technology	179
 Paper 12 IAEA safeguards technology	179
I. Introduction	179
II. The NPT and safeguards	180
III. The implementation of safeguards	180
IV. The future	185
 Paper 13. Safeguards techniques	187
I. Introduction	187
II. Nuclear energy programmes and safety measures	187
III. National and international safeguards	189
IV. Reprocessing plant safeguards	190
V. Safeguards for conversion and fabrication facilities	195
VI. Conclusions	195
 Chapter 9. Exporting policies	199
 Paper 14. Applications of US non-proliferation legislation for technical aspects of the control of fissionable materials in non-military applications	199
I. Introduction	199

II. The ideal use of nuclear energy	199
III. Overview of US legislation: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act	200
IV. Incentives to adhere to US non-proliferation ideas	203
V. Non-proliferation controls for international nuclear commerce	205
VI. Providing alternatives for nuclear power	212
VII. Other legislation affecting US non-proliferation policy	212
VIII. Implications for the control of certain technical nuclear activities	216
IX. Overview	220
Appendix 14A. Improving the reliability of the United States as a nuclear supplier: provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978	223
Appendix 14B. International assurances of reliable nuclear supplies in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978	223
Appendix 14C. Desired conditions for international nuclear trade specified in Section 403 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978	225
Appendix 14D. Desired limitations upon domestic use of nuclear power specified in Section 403 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978	225
Appendix 14E. List of actions triggering cut-off of US nuclear exports specified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978	226
Appendix 14F. Conditions for US agreements for nuclear cooperation required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 .	227
Appendix 14G. List of statutory criteria for approval of US nuclear exports	228
Appendix 14H. Notable procedural requirements for negotiation and renegotiation of agreements for nuclear cooperation	229
Appendix 14I. Notable requirements for NRC licensing of US nuclear exports	230
Appendix 14J. Notable procedural requirements for Department of Energy action on subsequent arrangements	232
Appendix 14K. Summary of provisions in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 relating to sanctions against certain proliferation actions	232
Appendix 14L. Summary of notable implications of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 for control of certain technological activities in the non-military applications of nuclear energy	234

Appendix 14M. Summary of provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 relating to enrichment of uranium	235
Appendix 14N. Summary of provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 relating to reprocessing of nuclear fuels ..	236
Appendix 14O. Summary of provisions in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 relating to nuclear explosives	238
Appendix 14P. Summary of provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 relating to safeguards technology	239
 Paper 15. Nuclear exporting policies	241
I. Introduction	241
II. Export and import policies	241
III. Safeguards measures	244
IV. The INFCE	248
 <i>Chapter 10. Multinational and international controls</i>	251
 Paper 16. A nuclear fuel supply cooperative: a way out of the non-proliferation débacle	251
I. Introduction	251
II. The inadequacy of safeguards	251
III. Recent measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime ..	252
IV. Multilateral institutional arrangements	253
V. The idea of a nuclear fuel supply cooperative	254
 Paper 17. A preliminary evaluation of the technical aspects of INFCE	261
I. INFCE: technical versus political content	261
II. The new fuel cycles	263
III. Proliferation resistance	264
IV. The basic solutions and their evolution	266
V. Conclusions	268
 Paper 18. Nuclear proliferation: arrangements for international control	271
I. Introduction	271
II. Existing control machinery and proposals to improve it	272
III. The energy problem of the Third World	278
IV. The need for global action	281
V. Concluding remarks	285

PART IV INTRODUCTION	287
I. Peaceful nuclear explosions	287
II. Reactors in satellites	290
<i>Chapter 11. Peaceful nuclear explosions</i>	<i>293</i>
Paper 19. Peaceful applications of nuclear explosions	293
I. Introduction	293
II. What explosions can be used for	293
III. Encouragement and discouragement to peaceful-use programmes	296
IV. The Indian explosion and horizontal proliferation	300
V. How international arms-control agreements affect peaceful-use explosions	301
VI. Conclusions	303
Paper 20. Technical aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions relevant to their possible role in the future proliferation of weapon-usable nuclear materials	307
I. Introduction	307
II. PNE applications	308
III. The health and environmental risks of PNE	309
IV. The technical and economical feasibility of PNE	312
V. The relation between PNE and nuclear weapon proliferation	314
VI. Concluding observations	317
<i>Chapter 12. Reactors in satellites</i>	<i>319</i>
Paper 21. Nuclear reactors in satellites	319
I. Introduction	319
II. The development and use of Snap devices by the USA	320
III. The Canadian experience with the Cosmos-954 satellite: operation 'Morning Light'	324
IV. Discussion and legal questions	327
V. Other power sources for satellites and the trend towards higher electric power output	329
VI. Concluding remark	330
PART V	333
<i>Chapter 13. Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>	<i>333</i>
I. Non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons	334
II. Nuclear safeguards	338
III. Physical protection of nuclear materials	340
IV. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	341

V. Nuclear fuel cycle centres	342
VI. Peaceful nuclear explosions	343
VII. Disarmament obligations	346
VIII. The security of non-nuclear weapon states	349
IX. The second review conference	350
Appendix A. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	352
Appendix B. Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 30 May 1975	357
Appendix C. List of states which have signed, ratified, acceded or succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as of March 1979	366
<i>Chapter 14. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation</i>	373
I. Introduction	373
II. The current nuclear power situation	373
III. The proliferation threat	398
IV. New technologies	407
V. Technological security	413
VI. Institutional security	418
VII. Further anti-proliferation measures and new initiatives	424
<i>Abstracts</i>	437
<i>Glossary</i>	447
<i>Index</i>	453