

War Finance, Reconstruction, Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Hungary, 1938–48

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Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	x
<i>List of Figures</i>	xiii
<i>Preface</i>	xv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xviii
<i>Chronological Survey of Major Events</i>	xix
1 Introduction and Summary	1
1.1 War Finance	2
1.2 The Economic Consequences of World War II	4
1.3 Hyperinflation	5
1.4 Stabilization	6
1.5 Why Study the Hungarian Hyperinflation?	7
1.6 The Framework of the Analysis	8
1.7 Plan of the Book	14
2 The Basic Data	17
2.1 Introduction	17
2.2 General Description of the Data	19
2.2.1 Prewar Data	19
2.2.2 Data from the Hyperinflation Period	20
– Money Supply and Government Debt	20
– Prices	27
– Unemployment and Output	39
2.3 Data from the Stabilization Period	40
3 Hungary and the German War Economy	43
3.1 Hungary's Dilemma	43
3.2 Supplying the German War Economy	44
3.3 Conclusions	52
4 The Győri Programme and its Macroeconomic Consequences	53
4.1 Introduction	53
4.2 The Győri Programme	54
4.3 The Credibility of the Győri Programme	58

4.4	Monetary Policy and Inflation, 1938–44	60
4.5	The Impact of the Györi Programme on the Labour Market	67
4.6	Conclusions	72
5	The End of the War and the Financial Toll of Reconstruction	73
5.1	The End of the War and Its Financial Toll	73
5.2	Reparations	77
6	State Finances and Peacetime Economic Prospects	85
6.1	Introduction	85
6.2	A Difficult Beginning	85
6.3	The Inevitability of the Inflation Tax	87
6.4	The Influence of Politics in the Choice of Policies	90
6.5	Reparations and Reconstruction	93
6.6	Conclusions	96
7	Attempts to Control Inflation	97
7.1	The Three Phases of the Hyperinflation	97
7.2	The Tax on the Pengő	100
7.3	The Pengő Indexation Experiment	102
7.4	'Calory' Wages	114
7.5	The Role and Significance of Alternative Transactions Media	117
8	Monetary and Fiscal Policy during the Hyperinflation	121
8.1	A Statistical Overview of the Hyperinflation	121
8.1.1	Money and Prices	121
8.1.2	Demand Money and Inflationary Expectations	123
8.1.3	Does the Hyperinflation Constitute a Homogeneous Period?	127
8.2	Policy Expectations and the Demand for Money	128
8.3	The Links Between Monetary Policy and Inflation	134
8.4	The Tax Pengő Period and the Final Acceleration of Inflation	138
8.5	Conclusions	142

9	The End of the Hyperinflation and Its Consequences	144
	9.1 Introduction	144
	9.2 A Quick End to the Hyperinflation?	145
	9.3 The Credibility of the Stabilization of August 1946	147
	9.4 Monetary Policy following Stabilization	150
	9.4.1 Demand for Money	150
	9.4.2 Prices, Money Supply, and Government Debt	152
	9.4.3 Policy Influences on Inflation	155
	9.5 Economic Costs of Price Stability	157
	9.5.1 Relative Price Effects	157
	9.5.2 Employment and Unemployment	160
	9.5.3 Output and Productivity	163
	9.5.4 Summary and Conclusions	166
10	The Lessons to be Learned from the Hyperinflation and Its Termination	168
	10.1 Introduction	168
	10.2 Supply-side Influences	168
	10.3 The Role of Credibility	172
	10.4 Applicability to Other Inflations	175
	10.4.1 Unemployment	176
	10.4.2 Indexation	177
	10.5 Concluding Remarks	179
	<i>Appendix A: Historical Statistics, 1938–48</i>	181
	1 <i>Daily Data: 1945–6</i>	181
	2 <i>Weekly Data: 1945–8</i>	200
	3 <i>Monthly Data: 1938–48</i>	209
	<i>Appendix B: Additional Statistical Results</i>	232
	<i>Notes and References</i>	237
	<i>Bibliography</i>	260
	<i>Glossary of Selected Terms</i>	276
	<i>Index</i>	278