## **Debt games**

## Strategic interaction in international debt rescheduling

VINOD K. AGGARWAL University of California, Berkeley



## Contents

	Preface Overview	page ix 1
	Part I. Argument	
	Examining the importance of epochs Debt games and play: toward a model of debt	15
3	rescheduling A situational theory of payoffs and intervention	44
	decisions	61
4	A theory of situational change	84
	Part II. Epoch 1: 1820s–1860s	
5	The intersection of high and low politics:	
	Mexican debt rescheduling, 1824–1867	101
6	Guano makes the world go 'round: Peruvian debt	
-	rescheduling, 1823–1850s	138
	Part III. Epoch 2: 1860s–1910s	
7	From stability to chaos: Mexican debt rescheduling,	
	1867–1914	163
8	To the victor go the spoils (and headaches):	
Ū	Peruvian debt rescheduling, 1875–1900s	197
	Part IV. Epoch 3: 1910s–1950s	
9	Riding on the storm: Mexican debt rescheduling,	
-	1916–1942	237
10	Years of false hope: Peruvian debt negotiations,	237
10	1930–1953	287
	Part V. Epoch 4: 1970s–1990s	
11	The good guys get tired: Mexican debt rescheduling	
	in the 1980s and 1990s	333
12	The politics of confrontation: Peruvian debt	222
12	rescheduling in the 1980s and 1990s	376
12	-	3/0
13	Collision course: Argentine debt rescheduling in the 1980s and 1990s	400
	1900s and 1990s	409

•

.

14	The search for independence: Brazilian debt rescheduling in the 1980s and 1990s	457
	Part VI. Implications	
15	Findings and avenues for future research	517
	Appendix Bibliography Index	561 573 603

.

.