# Political Instability, Interstate Conflict, Adverse Changes in Host Government Policies and Foreign Direct Investment A Sensitivity Analysis

Braimoh D. Oseghale

GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC.

NEW YORK & LONDON • 1993

### **Contents**

List	of figures vii
List	of tables ix
Ack	nowledgements xiii
1	Introduction
	Statement of the Problem
	Purpose of the Study 6
	Potential Contribution of the Study
	Scope of the Study 8
	Plan of the Study 8
2	Literature Review
	The Concept of Political Risk
	Level of Analysis
	Theoretical Models
	Smith's Model of Political Risk
	Root's Model of Political Risk
	Schollhammer's Model of Political Risk 20
	Simon's Model of Political Risk
	Empirical Studies
	Attitudinal Studies
	Behavioral Studies
	Limitations of Previous Studies
	Conclusion
3	Theoretical Framework
•	The Conceptual Framework
	Host Government Policies 46
	MNCs' FDI Decisions
	The Conceptual Model
	Hypotheses

#### vi Contents

4	Methodology
	Research Design
	Sample 69
	Econometric Model 70
	Variables and Data Sources
	Analytical Procedures
	Conclusion
5	Analysis of the Findings
	Statistical Procedures 9
	Statistical Results
	Multiple Regression Results
	MNCs' Manufacturing Foreign Direct
	Investment Decisions: New Inflows 11
	MNCs' Manufacturing Foreign Direct
	Investment: Reinvestment
	Regression Analysis: Controlling for
	Some Independent Variables
	Relative Importance of the Independent
	Variables
	Host Government Decisions
	MNCs' FDI Decisions: New Inflows 13
	MNCs' FDI Decisions: Reinvestment
	Interpretation of Findings
	· ·
6	Conclusions and Implications
	Summary
	Implications of Findings 14
	Multinational Companies 14
	Host Government Policy Implications 15
	Limitations of the Study 15
	Suggestions for Future Research 15
Bib	liography
Ind	ex 16

# List of Figures

2.1	Smith's Model of Political Risk 16
2.2	Root's Model of Political Risk
2.3	The Political-Social Process Model
2.4	Schollhammer's Model of Political Risk
2.5	Simon's Model of Political Risk
3.1	Components of Business Environment
3.2	Political Risk and FDI: A Conceptual Scheme 45
5.1	Political Risk and MFDI 141
5.2	Political Risk and Reinvestment

## List of Tables

1.1	U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Position in Some Selected Countries
2.1	A Typology of Macro Risk 22
2.2	Relationship Between Research Method and Findings in the Extant Literature
2.3	Measurement of FDI and the Level of Aggregation 39
2.4	Shortcomings of the Extant Literature 43
3.1	Net U.S. Capital Flows 1950-1965 and 1960-1968 47
4.1	U.S. FDI in Sampled Countries as Percentage of U.S. Total FDI in Latin American Countries
4.2	Rank-Ordering of Indicators of CGP 77
4.3	Relative Importance of Political Environmental Factors
4.4	The Weighting of CGP Indicators 79
4.5	Reliability Test Results for the Indicators of CGP 86
4.6	Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) 82
4.7	Reliability Test Results for the Indicators of Political Instability
4.8	Reliability Test Results for the Indicators of Inter-State Conflict

x	Tabl	es
х	I aoi	es

4.9	Sources of Data
5.1	Specification Test Results 101
5.2	Inter-correlation Results for Argentina 103
5.3	Inter-correlation Results for Brazil 104
5.4	Inter-correlation Results for Chile
5.5	Inter-correlation Results for Colombia 108
5.6	Inter-correlation Results for Mexico 109
5.7	Inter-correlation Results for Panama 111
5.8	Inter-correlation Results for Peru 112
5.9	Inter-correlation Results for Venezuela 113
5.10	Multiple Regression Results (Dep. Variable = CGP) . 116
5.11	Regression Results (Dep. Variable = MFDI) 120
5.12	Regression Results (Dep. Variable = Reinv) 125
5.13	Multiple Regression Results (Dep. Variable = RESID) 129
5.14	Multiple Regression Results (Dep. Variable = RESID) 130
5.15	The Relative Importance of Independent Variables (Dep. Variable = CGP)
5.16	The Relative Importance of Independent Variables (Dep. Variable = MFDI)
5.17	The Relative Importance of Independent Variables (Dep. Variable = REINV)
5.18	Hypotheses Test Results (Dep. Variable = CGP) 138

.

- 5.19 Hypotheses Test Results (Dep. Variable = MFDI) . . 139
- 5.20 Hypotheses Test Results (Dep. Variable = REINV) . 142

.