

Inflation and investment controls in China

The political economy of central–local relations
during the reform era

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Contents

List of figures and tables	page	ix
Acknowledgments		xiii
List of abbreviations		xvi
1 Introduction		1
Research aims and strategy		4
Local officials in the Chinese political system		8
Investment policy conflicts in China		10
Some definitions		20
Organization of the book		22
 <i>Part I The economic and political roles of local government officials</i>		
2 Local government officials as economic agents		27
Central–local economic institutional arrangements		28
Control over economic resources		32
Conclusion		56
Appendix		58
3 Local bureaucrats as investors: The investment roles of local governments		63
The evolution of the Chinese investment system before the reform era		63
Local investment controls and development imperatives		67
Investment management		73
Conclusion		85
4 The local officials in the bureaucratic hierarchy		89
The cadre management system		90
Monitoring in the Chinese bureaucratic system		96

Central administrative control during the reform era	107
Conclusion	119
Appendix	122
<i>Part II Macroeconomic policy developments during the reform era</i>	
5 Excess investment demand and austerity policies	127
Excess investment demand in China	127
Central investment concerns during the reform era	151
Austerity policies	158
Conclusion	174
<i>Part III Analyzing local investment behavior</i>	
6 Explaining local investment behavior	179
An analytical framework	180
A bureaucratic model of investment behavior	186
Conclusion	206
Appendix	208
7 Strategic investment behavior during austerity	212
Aggregate impact of austerity policies	214
Monitoring and investment behavior	228
Monitoring and investment behavior: Empirical evidence	233
Conclusion	257
Appendix	258
8 Bureaucratic investment behavior	265
Model building	267
Bureaucratic status and investment behavior	276
Conclusion	294
Appendix	297
9 Conclusion: Political institutions, inflation control, and economic reforms	305
Summary of findings	305
The nature of Chinese political institutions	315
Political institutions, inflation control, and economic reforms	317
References	331
Name index	359
Subject index	363

Figures and tables

Figures

2.1	Consolidated revenues as a share of GNP, 1979–92	<i>page</i> 48
2.2	Adjusted central and local revenue as a share of GNP, 1982–92	50
4.1	Removals and additions of secondary provincial officials as percentages of total officials, 1976–92	110
4.2	Appointments of provincial Party secretaries and governors, 1976–92	112
A4.1	Number of positions of Party and government establishments, 1976–92	123
A4.2	Coefficients of variation for the Party and government establishment positions, 1976–92	124
5.1	Unfinished investments as a percentage of total capital construction investments and net material product, 1976–93	129
5.2	Macroeconomic developments in China, 1979–93	154
6.1	Bureaucratic integration by provinces, 1976–92	192
6.2	Four types of provincial governance, 1976–92	193
7.1	Annual provincial mean growth rates of net material product and of local investment, 1977–92	245
7.2	Annual growth dispersions of net material product and of local investment, 1977–92	246

Tables

1.1	Survey results of central and local officials	20
2.1	Rank equivalents among government organizations	29
2.2	Managerial responsibilities of sixty-five enterprises in Sichuan, 1970	34

2.3	Number of products under central allocation in the former Soviet Union and China, 1950–85	38
2.4	Provincial tax contributions, 1988	54
A2.1	Central ministries and provincial bureaus in different economic sectors, 1990	59
A2.2	Central units with vertical leadership relationships, 1990	60
A2.3	Reconstruction of Chinese budgetary data, 1991	61
A2.4	Central revenue collections and provincial contributions, selected years	61
3.1	Measures of local control over investment activities, 1981–91	68
3.2	Changes in the provincial investment review and approval authority in the 1980s	79
3.3	Central and local controls over capital goods allocation, 1980 and 1987	84
4.1	Provincial officials managed by the Department of Organization, 1990	93
4.2	Central SSB personnel, selected years, and personnel reductions from 1965 to 1976	104
4.3	Standard deviation values of local Party and government positions and of tenure length, before and after 1983	114
4.4	Regression of tenure of government officials	117
5.1	Investment characteristics of selected countries, selected years	131
5.2	Official assessments of investment performance, selected years	157
5.3	Quarterly monetary course, 1986–87	169
7.1	Central investment objectives during rounds of austerity policy	215
7.2	Average provincial growth rates by investment categories	219
7.3	Resource shifts among investment categories during austerity and inflationary policy regimes	221
7.4	Annual mean growth rates, standard deviations, and investment trade-offs under an austerity policy, before and during the economic reforms	224
7.5	Inter- and intrapolicy period Pearson coefficients of growth rates	238
7.6	Investment growth dispersions under two macroeconomic policy regimes	238
7.7	Allocation of local investment reduction among shirker and sucker provinces during austerity periods	243
7.8	Moral hazard in local investment conduct as measured by performance difference index, 1977–92	250

7.9	Changes in policy commitment and local investment behavior, 1979–91	255
A7.1	Henan's investment approval requirements, 1985 and 1986	259
A7.2	Performance/plan ratios for central and local investment projects in ten provinces, 1981–89	261
A7.3	Investment activity as a governmental activity	263
8.1	Summary of hypotheses	276
8.2	Three baseline models	280
8.3	Economic characteristics and bureaucratic integration, annual provincial averages, 1976–92	282
8.4	Appointments and local investment deviation from the previous year	284
8.5	Tenure duration and local investment behavior	286
8.6	Local, renovation, and central investments and the central–local investment trade-off	289
8.7	Bureaucratic coefficients as a function of austerity policy and economic reforms	293
A8.1	Four model specifications	300
A8.2	Variations of $BM_{(joint)} + FM$	301
A8.3	Stepwise procedure to check on multicollinearity	302
A8.4	<i>F</i> -Statistics of the future values of APP, TENURE, and BINT with one to three future lags	303
9.1	Central governments' fiscal positions and inflation: China in comparative perspectives	322