
The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War

Government, armed forces and
defence policy 1963–1967

Ami Gluska

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xviii
Introduction	1
1 Personnel changes in the defence establishment	14
2 Basic security issues	22
3 Escalation – Stage 1: from skirmishes in the demilitarized zones to aerial sorties	40
4 Escalation – Stage 2: diversion	48
5 The dispute with Syria worsens	59
6 Escalation – Stage 3: ‘harassment’	66
7 The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’	74
8 Israel–Jordan: the Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian dilemma	84
9 The clash with Syria approaches	92
10 Conflagration	98
11 The trigger	108

12	The start of the crisis	121
13	The era of diplomacy	131
14	The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift to offensive planning	142
15	<i>Casus belli</i>	152
16	The army pressures the government	160
17	The politicians' quandary	173
18	The height of the diplomatic campaign – and the outcome	180
19	Waiting	194
20	Establishment of a national unity government: the military aspect	204
21	The strategic turning point: the Egypt–Jordan defence pact	216
22	The decisive meeting in the Pit: the Ministerial Committee versus the General Staff	223
23	The decisive stage: war	238
	Afterword	257
	<i>Appendix: what happened to Yitzhak Rabin?</i>	262
	<i>Biographical notes</i>	269
	<i>Notes</i>	272
	<i>Select English bibliography</i>	313
	<i>Index</i>	317