Differential Games in Economics and Management Science

Engelbert J. Dockner
University of Vienna

Steffen Jørgensen
University of Southern Denmark, Odense University

Ngo Van Long
McGill University and CIRANO, Montreal

Gerhard Sorger
Queen Mary and Westfield College, London
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