

Talk About Beliefs

Mark Crimmins

A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England

Contents

Preface	ix
1 Naïve Semantics	1
1.1 The Issue	1
1.2 Support from Above	6
1.2.1 Compositionality	7
1.2.2 Full Articulation	9
1.2.3 Direct Reference	11
1.2.4 Deriving the Naïve Analysis	12
1.2.5 How the Theoretical Support Goes Wrong	15
1.3 Implicature and Cancelability	21
1.4 Translation	26
1.5 Richard's Steamroller	29
1.6 Persisting Beliefs and Platitudes	32
2 Instances of Believing	35
2.1 Belief States	35
2.2 Cognitive Particulars	53
2.3 Tacit Belief	58
3 Ideational Belief	75
3.1 Ideas and Notions	76
3.2 Representations as Particulars	78
3.3 Contents of Notions	80
3.4 Contents of Ideas	92
4 Structure, Propositions, and Beliefs	99
4.1 Overview	99
4.2 Constituent Structure	111
4.2.1 Basic Structural Concepts	114
4.2.2 Axioms for Constituent Structure	115
4.3 A Simple Theory of Propositions	116

4.3.1	Basic Logical Concepts	117
4.3.2	Axioms for Structured Propositions	118
4.3.3	Roles and Pedigrees	119
4.3.4	Truth and Holding	122
4.3.5	Logical Relations	123
4.4	Structured Beliefs and Thought Maps	124
4.4.1	Depiction of Actual Representations	127
4.4.2	Maps of Potential Representations	129
4.5	Content and Responsibility	130
4.6	Systems of Ideational Representation	133
5	Belief Reports	141
5.1	The Truth about Giorgione	141
5.2	Semantics	145
5.3	Reporting Beliefs: Semantics	152
5.4	Providing Representations: Pragmatics	158
5.4.1	Normal Notions and Ideas	158
5.4.2	Notions Linked to Action and Perception	161
5.4.3	Self-Attribution and Indexical Belief	163
5.4.4	De Dicto Reports	165
5.4.5	Notional Specificity	168
5.4.6	De Re Reports: Are There Any?	170
6	Other Reports	181
6.1	Presuppositions and Denials	181
6.2	General Reports	190
6.3	Embedded Reports and Reference Failure	193
6.4	Other Propositional Attitudes	196
7	Frege and Russell	203
	References	207
	Index	213