

PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN GERMANY

A Neo-Institutional Analysis

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Foreword	I
1 Introduction	1
2 Why Privatization?	6
2.1 Ownership and the Coherence of Economic Systems	9
2.1.1 Market Regimes and Ownership	9
2.1.2 The Incoherence of Market-socialist Reforms	14
2.1.3 Ownership and Transformation	16
2.2 Ownership and the Efficiency of Economic Systems	18
2.3 The Transaction Costs of Alternative Ownership Regimes	24
2.3.1 Market Failure versus Bureaucratic Failure	27
2.3.2 State Ownership versus Private Ownership	32
2.3.3 Private versus Public Goods	36
2.4 Conclusions	40
3 Transaction Costs of Privatization	42
3.1 Assumptions and Working Hypothesis	43
3.2 Constraints and Scarce Factors Affecting Privatization	46
3.2.1 Capital Supply	46
3.2.2 Limited Economic Competence	50
3.2.3 Limited Capabilities of Privatization Agencies	51
3.3 Efficiency of Alternative Privatization Procedures	52
3.3.1 Privatization through Informal Bargaining	54
3.3.2 Management-buyout and -buyin	60
3.3.3 Privatization by Auction	62
3.3.4 Sale of Company Shares on the Stock Exchange	69
3.3.5 Voucher Schemes	77
3.3.6 Restitution	80
3.4 Privatization with Limited Buyer Competition	83

3.5	Conclusions: Allocative Effects of Privatization Procedures	95
4	Distributive and Welfare Effects of Privatization	98
4.1	Norms of Justice and Privatization	99
4.2	Privatization and Procedural Justice: The Problem of "Nomenclature Privatization"	101
4.3	Distributive Effects of Different Privatization Techniques	106
4.3.1	Sales Procedures	107
4.3.2	Cost-free Transfer	110
4.4	Conclusions	114
5	Transformation of the Legal and Economic Framework	116
5.1	Transformation of the Legal System	116
5.2	Transformation of the Economic System in Eastern Germany	122
5.2.1	The Transformation of an Economy of Shortage through the Monetary Union	122
5.3	The Effects of Price-cost Squeeze on Eastern German Enterprises	127
5.3.1	The Rise in Factor Costs	127
5.3.2	The Effects of the Price-cost Squeeze on the Profitability of Eastern German Enterprises	129
5.4	The Conditions for Direct Investment in Eastern Germany	135
5.5	Conclusions for the Privatization of Eastern German Enterprises	139
6	Strategy and Results of Treuhand-Privatization	140
6.1	The Scope and Value of the Treuhandanstalt's Assets	141
6.2	Initial Conditions and Constraints	147
6.2.1	The Participation Constraint	147

6.2.2	The Macroeconomic Capital Supply	149
6.2.3	Limited Buyer Competence and Financial Endowment	151
6.3	The Treuhandanstalt's Privatization Strategy	152
6.3.1	Sale versus Cost-free Distribution	152
6.3.2	Privatization Before or After Rehabilitation	154
6.3.3	The Choice of Allocative Criteria	155
6.4	Choice of Privatization Procedures	159
6.4.1	Privatization by Means of Informal Bargaining	160
6.4.2	Privatization by Means of Standard Procedures	164
6.5	Limited Bidding Competition	167
6.6	Principal-agent Problems Facing the Treuhandanstalt	170
6.7	A Balance of the Treuhandanstalt's Privatization Activity	173
6.7.1	Scope of Privatization	173
6.7.2	Privatization Revenues	179
6.7.3	Conclusions	181
7	Transaction Costs of Rehabilitation Contracts	182
7.1	The Contractual Problem	183
7.2	An Analysis of Rehabilitation Contracts by Game-theory	187
7.2.1	Description of the Model	187
7.2.2	Optimal Contract Design (Mechanism Design)	189
7.3	Empirical Findings	199
8	Rehabilitation versus Privatization: A Comparative Analysis	201
8.1	The Economic Controversy	201
8.2	A Comparative Analysis of the Transaction Costs of Private- and Public-rehabilitation Regimes	205
8.2.1	Description of the Model	205
8.2.2	Rehabilitation by the Treuhandanstalt	208
8.2.3	Rehabilitation by an Entrepreneur	216
8.2.4	Rehabilitation by a Rentier	221

8.3	The Treuhandanstalt's Rehabilitation Policy	225
8.3.1	Payment of Maintenance Subsidies	227
8.3.2	Finance of Investments	229
8.3.3	Rational Selection	231
9	Conclusions	234
	Notes	241
	References	251
List of Figures		
Figure 3.1	Privatization Procedures	53
Figure 3.2	Payoffs in the Rubinstein-Game	90
Figure 3.3	Rubinstein-Game with Latent Bidding Competition	92
Figure 3.4	Payoffs of the Rubinstein-Game with Latent Bidding Competition	93
Figure 3.5	Comparative Features of Privatization Procedures	94
Figure 6.1	Strategic Alternatives of the Treuhandanstalt	153
Figure 6.2	Privatization Procedures of the Treuhandanstalt	160
Figure 7.1	Rehabilitation Game with Asymmetrical Information	190
Figure 8.1	Alternative Rehabilitation Regimes	207
Figure 8.2	Rehabilitation by the Treuhandanstalt	209
Figure 8.3	Private Rehabilitation Regimes	217
List of Tables		
Table 3.1	Allocative Effects of Privatization Procedures	97
Table 5.1	Key Economic Indicators for Eastern Germany	125
Table 5.2	Decline in Gross Domestic Product and Industrial Production in Central and Eastern Europe	126

Table 5.3	Development of Wages and Productivity in Eastern Germany	129
Table 5.4	Projection of Cost-revenue Development in Eastern Germany, 1989 Production Potential (Manufacturing)	131
Table 5.5	Losses of Treuhandanstalt's Enterprises, 1991	133
Table 5.6	Development of Costs Revenues of Treuhandanstalt's Enterprises, 1991 and 1992	134
Table 5.7	Capital Stock and Changes in Production Potential	139
Table 6.1	Assets of the Treuhandanstalt	143
Table 6.2	Balance-sheet Value of Treuhandanstalt's Holdings and other Assets as of July 1, 1990	145
Table 6.3	Management Buyouts and Enterprise Size Class	163
Table 6.4	State of Privatization as of December 31, 1994	175
Table 6.5	Changes in the Treuhandanstalt's Holdings	177
Table 6.6	Changes in Agricultural and Forestry Assets	178
Table 6.7	Privatization Revenues	180
Table 8.1	Payments of the Treuhandanstalt to its Enterprises	228
Table 8.2	Investment and Ownership in Eastern Germany's Manufacturing Sector (Investments in DM per Employee)	230
Table 8.3	Employment in Treuhandanstalt's Firms and Ex-Treuhandanstalt's Firms	231