

CLAUSEWITZ AND AFRICAN WAR

Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia

Isabelle Duyvesteyn



FRANK CASS
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CONTENTS

<i>Preface and acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	xiii
1 Clausewitz, the nature of war and African warfare	1
<i>War 1</i>	
<i>Non-trinitarian war 2</i>	
<i>Trinitarian war 5</i>	
<i>African war 7</i>	
<i>Hypotheses and cases 9</i>	
2 Case study I: Liberia, 1989–97	21
<i>Liberia: a short overview 21</i>	
<i>The protagonists 25</i>	
<i>Phase 1, 24 December 1989–29 November 1990 27</i>	
<i>Phase 2, 15 October 1992–31 July 1993 32</i>	
<i>Phase 3, Post-July 1993 33</i>	
<i>Observations on the Liberian war 35</i>	
3 Case study II: Somalia, 1988–95	37
<i>Somalia: a short overview 37</i>	
<i>The protagonists 40</i>	
<i>Phase 1, 27 May 1988–27 January 1991 44</i>	
<i>Phase 2, 28 January 1991–3 March 1992 46</i>	
<i>Phase 3, 9 December 1992–28 March 1995 49</i>	
<i>Observations on the Somali war 51</i>	

4	Political actors	53
	<i>Introduction</i>	53
	<i>A political system</i>	53
	<i>A political actor and trinitarian war</i>	73
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	74
5	Political interests	75
	<i>Introduction</i>	75
	<i>Political interests</i>	75
	<i>Political rule</i>	81
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	90
6	Political instruments and conventional war	93
	<i>Introduction</i>	93
	<i>Centre of gravity</i>	94
	<i>Distinction between combatants and non-combatants</i>	99
	<i>Number of recruits</i>	101
	<i>Conventional war</i>	102
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	105
7	Politics and strategy in African wars: intervention dilemmas	107
	<i>Findings</i>	107
	<i>Implications</i>	110
	<i>Political dilemmas</i>	111
	<i>Military dilemmas</i>	118
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	125
	<i>Notes</i>	126
	<i>Bibliography</i>	161
	<i>Index</i>	177