

Wittgenstein, Frege
and the
Vienna Circle



Gordon Baker

Basil Blackwell

Contents

Preface	ix
Abbreviations	xix
 Part I Philosophy of Logic	 1
Introduction	3
1 Frege	7
1 The science of logic	8
2 The elements of logical analysis	17
3 Thought and language	28
2 'Notes on Logic'	34
1 Initial insights	37
2 Early criticisms of Frege's philosophy of logic	51
3 Some presuppositions of Wittgenstein's criticisms	63
3 <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>	70
1 Continuity through change	73
2 'Logic is transcendental'	83
3 Criticisms of Frege	101
4 Wittgenstein: Later Reflections on Logic	112
1 Demolition and reconstruction	116
2 Logical constants and the propositions of logic	129
3 Frege reconsidered	149
4 Ils n'ont rien appris, ni rien oublié	160

Part II	Varieties of Conventionalism	167
5	Early Conventionalism	169
1	The search for consistent empiricism	169
2	The roots of logical empiricism: Hilbert and Poincaré	178
3	Early logical empiricism: Schlick's conventionalism	187
6	The Conventionalism of the Vienna Circle	207
1	The influence of the <i>Tractatus</i>	207
2	Mature logical empiricism	219
7	Wittgenstein and Consistent Conventionalism	236
1	Philosophical typology	236
2	The dark side of the <i>Tractatus</i>	245
3	Later Wittgenstein: grammar and necessity	255
	Index	269