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Political Power and Economic Policy

*Theory, Analysis, and Empirical
Applications*

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Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page xi</i>
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>xiv</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xv</i>

PART 1 POLITICAL POWER AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

1	Public Policy: The Lens of Political Economy	3
1.1	Introduction	3
1.2	The Lens of Political Economy	6
1.3	Literature Review	10
1.4	Structure and Major Themes of the Book	21
2	The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem	30
2.1	Introduction	30
2.2	The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem with Fixed Disagreement Payoffs	32
2.3	The Pivotal Axiom and Alternative Approaches	34
2.4	Conclusion	49
3	The Harsanyi Solution to the Bargaining Problem	50
3.1	Introduction	50
3.2	Endogenous Disagreement Payoffs	51
3.3	The n -Person Bargaining Game	54
3.4	Reciprocal Power Relations	58
3.5	Conclusion	63
4	Political-Economic Analysis	64
4.1	Introduction	64
4.2	Organization of the Political System	65
4.3	The Political-Economic Structure	67

4.4	Conflict Resolution and the Equilibrium Relations	73
4.5	Conclusion	87
5	Normative Political-Economic Analysis	95
5.1	Introduction	95
5.2	Evaluation Criteria of Social Benefits and Costs	96
5.3	Political-Economic Efficiency Conditions	104
5.4	Evaluation of Structural Policies	108
5.5	Conclusion	110
6	Dynamic Political-Economic Analysis	113
6.1	Introduction	113
6.2	The General Structure of a Political Economy as a Dynamic System	114
6.3	The Dynamics of Political Power	116
6.4	Political "Traps" and Policy Reforms	120
6.5	Conclusion	122
PART 2 IDEOLOGY, PRESCRIPTION, AND POLITICAL POWER COEFFICIENTS		
7	Political Power, Ideology, and Political Organizational Structures	125
7.1	Introduction	125
7.2	The Nature of Ideology	126
7.3	Ideological Commitment and Policy Formation	128
7.4	Implications for Empirical Analysis	130
7.5	The Organization of Interest Groups and Policy Formation	131
7.6	Interest Groups and the Organization for Collective Action	132
7.7	Political Entrepreneurs, Internal Group Organization, and Within-Group Equilibrium	135
7.8	Group Political Preferences and Political Power	138
7.9	Implications of the Organization of Interest Groups	140
7.10	Government Structure	141
7.11	Political Parties	144
7.12	Conclusion	145
8	Political Power, Influence, and Lobbying	147
8.1	Introduction	147
8.2	General Formulation of the Framework	148
8.3	Costs of Organization	150
8.4	Lobbying as a Common-Agency Problem	155

8.5	Lobbying under Asymmetric Information	164
8.6	Expanding the Framework: PERTs and PESTs	172
8.7	Conclusion	175
9	Constitutional Prescription and Political Power Coefficients	177
9.1	Introduction	177
9.2	Constitutional Rules and Policy-Making Centers	180
9.3	Evaluation of Alternative Constitutional Rules	183
9.4	Constitutional Space Prescription	186
9.5	Conclusion	189
PART 3 ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC STRUCTURES		
10	The Political Economy of Commodity Market Intervention	193
10.1	Introduction	193
10.2	The Political Structure	195
10.3	Policy Formation: The Political-Economic Equilibrium	198
10.4	Welfare Implications	207
10.5	Conclusion	208
11	The Political Economy of Public Research and Development	209
11.1	Introduction	209
11.2	Market Relations and the Demand for Public R&D	211
11.3	Management and Organization of Public R&D	216
11.4	The Political Structure	217
11.5	The Political-Economic Equilibrium Policy	220
11.6	Efficiency of the Political-Economic Equilibrium Public Research Policy	221
11.7	Conclusion	222
12	Political-Economic Analysis of Redistributive Policies and Public Good Investments	224
12.1	Introduction	224
12.2	The Government's Policy Decisions	226
12.3	Price Subsidies and Research Expenditures: Are They Complements or Substitutes?	232
12.4	Conclusion	236
13	Interest Groups, Coalition Breaking, and Productive Policies	239
13.1	Introduction	239
13.2	Interest Group Structure	241
13.3	Targeting Payments under Heterogeneous Adoption	243

13.4	Non-coincidental Consumer and Taxpayer Interests and Output Constraints	248
13.5	Other Transfer Schemes	251
13.6	Conclusion	252
	Appendix to Chapter 13	254
14	Policy Reform and Compensation	258
14.1	Introduction	258
14.2	The Model	260
14.3	The Political-Economic Equilibrium	268
14.4	Compensation, Ownership, and Mobility	275
14.5	Conclusions	278
14.6	Appendix to Chapter 14	279
15	Political-Economic Analysis of Land Reform	282
15.1	Introduction	282
15.2	The Economic Structure	283
15.3	The Political Structure	287
15.4	The Political-Economic Equilibrium	290
15.5	Evaluating the Economic Efficiency of Land Reform	296
15.6	Conclusion	304
16	Political-Economic Analysis of Water Resource Systems	306
16.1	Introduction	306
16.2	The Structure of a Water Resource Political Economy	307
16.3	The Physical Water Resource Sub-system	308
16.4	The Economic Structure	310
16.5	The Political Power Structure	315
16.6	The Hydrological-Political-Economic Equilibrium	318
16.7	Conjunctive Water Use with Short Water Supply	321
16.8	Conclusion	325
16.A	The Effects of Districts' Narrow Rationality on Water Prices and the Stationary Groundwater Level (Ample Water Supply at the Northern Source)	326
16.B	The Effects of Districts' Narrow Rationality on Groundwater Level When Groundwater Pumping Is Rationed (Short Water Supply)	327
17	The Political Economy Lens on Quality and Public Standard Regulations	329
17.1	Introduction	329
17.2	Interest Group Configuration	330
17.3	The Political Economy of Public Standards	333

17.4	Trade and Economic Development	335
17.5	A Dynamic and Strategic Political Economy Theory of Quality Regulation	338
17.6	Conclusion	346
18	Political-Economic Analysis in Transition Economies	348
18.1	Introduction	348
18.2	The Model	354
18.3	Restructuring the Inter-temporal Tradeoff	363
18.4	Open and Closed Economies	368
18.5	Vicious and Virtuous Circles	373
18.6	Structural Conditions, Communist Organization, and the " $\rho - \delta$ -Temporal Tradeoff"	375
18.7	Conclusion	377
18.A	The Monotonicity Property	378
19	The Power of Bureaucracies: The European Commission and EU Policy Reforms	380
19.1	Introduction	380
19.2	The Decision-Making Process	382
19.3	Status Quo Bias: The Importance of External Changes for Policy Reform	387
19.4	The Power of the Commission	388
19.5	Conclusion	389
PART 4 EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER ESTIMATION		
20	Political Econometrics	393
20.1	Introduction	393
20.2	Formulation	395
20.3	Estimation and Testing	397
20.4	Policy Instruments and the Negotiation Network	406
20.5	Conclusion	410
21	The Political Econometrics of the Israeli Dairy Industry	411
21.1	Introduction	411
21.2	The Israeli Dairy Program	411
21.3	The Economic Structure of the Israeli Dairy Market	412
21.4	The Political Structure of the Israeli Dairy Industry	414
21.5	The Political-Economic Equilibrium in the Israeli Dairy Market	416

21.6	The Internal Structure of the Political Conflict	419
21.7	Conclusion	421
22	Flexible Policy Instruments Given a Political-Power Distribution	424
22.1	Introduction	424
22.2	Specification and Estimation of the Constraint Structure	426
22.3	Estimation of the Policy Governance Function	427
22.4	Estimation of the Automatic Adjustment Rules	432
22.5	Validation and Assessment of the Automatic Adjustment Rules	438
22.6	Toward a Simpler Set of Automatic Adjustment Rules	440
22.7	Conclusion	442
22.A	Estimated Constraint Structure Equations	443
23	Estimating Statistical Properties of Power Weight Parameters and Their Temporal Shifts	451
23.1	Introduction	451
23.2	Empirical Formulation	451
23.3	Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Power Weight Parameters	453
23.4	An Empirical Application to Japanese Policy	457
23.5	Conclusion	465
24	The Role of Institutions in the Joint Determination of PERTs and PESTs	467
24.1	Introduction	467
24.2	PERTs and PESTs in Developing and Developed Countries	470
24.3	The Impact of Development: A Conceptual Model	475
24.4	The Impact of Institutions	478
24.5	Econometric Analysis	480
24.6	Regression Results	483
24.7	Conclusions and Implications	487
	<i>References</i>	489
	<i>Index</i>	515