## Ali Sunyaev Health-Care Telematics in Germany

Design and Application of a Security Analysis Method

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## Contents

List of Figures		
Li	st of Tables	xix
1	Introduction	1
	1.1 Motivation	
	1.2 Objectives of the Thesis	6
	1.3 Research Methodology	9
	1.3.1 Design Science	10
	1.3.2 Research Design	
	1.3.3 Design Theory	13
	1.3.4 Theoretical Contribution and Research Outcome	14
	1.4 Practical Implications, Users, and Beneficiaries	
2	Healthcare Telematics in Germany with Respect to Security Issues	17
	2.1 German Healthcare	17
	2.1.1 Structure of German Healthcare	
	2.1.2 Characteristics of the German Healthcare Sector	
	2.1.2.1 Information Exchange and Distributed Information Flows	in
	German Healthcare System	19
	2.1.2.2 Current Problems	20
	2.1.2.3 Specifics of the German Healthcare Domain	21
	2.2 Information Systems in Healthcare	
	2.2.1 Seamless Healthcare	
	2.2.2 Interoperability, Standards and Standardization Approaches in	
	Healthcare	24
	2.2.2.1 Communication Standards	27
	2.2.2.2 Documentations Standards and Standardization Approaches	
	2.2.3 Healthcare IS Architecture Types	
	2.2.3.1 Monolithic System	
	2.2.3.2 Heterogeneous System	
	2.2.3.3 Service-Oriented IS Architecture	

	2.2.4 Implications for Security Issues of Healthcare Information Systems	. 36
	2.3 Healthcare Telematics	. 39
	2.3.1 Definitions and Objectives of Healthcare Telematics	. 39
	2.3.2 German Healthcare Telematics	. 42
	§ 2.3.2,1 Healthcare Telematics Infrastructure	. 42
	2.3.2.2 Electronic Health Card	.44
	2.3.3 Risk and Security Issues of Healthcare Telematics	.46
	2.4 Šummary	. 52
3	Catalogue of IS Healthcare Security Characteristics	53
	3.1 Legal Framework	54
	3.1.1 Privacy	. 54
	3.1.2 Legal Requirements	. 55
	2.2 Protection Goals	56
	3.2 1 Dependable Healthcare Information Systems	. 50
	3.2.2 Controllability of Healthcare Information Systems	59
	3.3 Characteristics of IS Security Approaches with Respect to Healthcare	62
	3.3.1 Literature Review	64
	3.3.2 Overview of Healthcare IS Security Approach Characteristics	66
	3.3.2.1 General IS Security Approach Characteristics	66
	3.3.2.2 General IS Security Approach Characteristics with Reference to	
	Healthcare	67
	3.3.2.2.1 Type of the IS Security Approach	68
	3.3.2.2.2 Common Characteristics	69
	3.3.2.2.3 Methodology	73
	3.3.2.2.4 Surrounding Conditions	76
	3.3.2.3 Healthcare-Specific IS Security Approach Characteristics	77
	3.4 Summary	81
4	Analysis of IS Security Analysis Approaches	83
	4.1 Overview	83
	4.2 Review of Literature	84
	4.3 Existing Literature Reviews	87

\_\_\_\_\_

	4.4 Theoretical Background	91
	4.5 Systematization of IS Security Analysis Approaches	
	4.5.1 Checklists	95
	4.5.2 Assessment Approaches	
	4.5,2.1 Risk Assessment Approaches	
	4.5.2.2 Security Control Assessment Approaches	
	4.5.3 Risk Analysis Approaches	
	4.5.4 IT Security Management Approaches	
	4.5.4.1 The Plan-Do-Check-Act Approach of ISO 27001	104
	4.5.4.2 Best Practice Models	105
	4.5.5 "Legislation Accommodations	106
	4.6 Analysis of IS Security Analysis Approaches with Respect to Healthcar	re 108
	4.6.1 Examination of IS Security Approaches with Respect to General IS	
	Security Approach Characteristics	110
	4.6.2 Examination of IS Security Approaches with Respect to General IS	
	Security Approach Characteristics with Reference to Healthcare	111
	4.6.3 Examination of IS Security Approaches with Respect to Healthcare	;
	Specific IS Security Approach Characteristics	113
	4.7 Summary	114
5	Designing a Security Analysis Method for Healthcare Telematics in	
	Germany	117
	5.1 Introduction	117
	5.2 Research Approach	
	5.3 Method Engineering	120
	5.4 Description of Method Elements	
	5.4.1 Method Chains and Alliances	
	5.4.2 Method Fragments	122
	5.4.3 Method Chunks	126
	5.4.4 Method Components	126
	5.4.5 Theoretical Background	127
	5.5 Formal Description of the Concept of Method Engineering	128
	5.6 HatSec Security Analysis Method	

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	5.6.1	From Plan-Do-Check-Act Approach to a IS Security Analysis Meth	od
		for Healthcare Telematics	
	5.6.2	Design of the HatSec Security Analysis Method	134
	5.6.2	2.1 Method Blocks and Method Fragments	
	5.6.2	2.2 Overview of the Building Blocks of the HatSec Method	137
	<sup>°</sup> 5.6.2	2.3 Perspectives of the HatSec Method	
	5.6.2	2.4 Context and Preparation of the Security Analysis	139
	5.6.2	2.5 Security Analysis Process	143
	5.6.2	2.6 Security Analysis Product	148
	5.6.2	2.7 Two Sides of the HatSec Method	152
	5.6.2	2.8 HatSec Structure	154
	5.7 Re	view of the HatSec Security Analysis Method	161
	5.8 Su	mmary	165
6	Practica	Application of the HatSec Method	167
	6.1 Sel	- ected Case Studies	
	6.2 As	sessment and Classification of Threats around the Electronic Health	
	Ca	rd	169
	6.2.1	Overview	170
	6.2.2	Identification and Classification of the Attackers	171
	6.2.3	Identification and Classification of the Attack Types	173
	6.2.4	Summary	175
	6.3 An	alysis of the Applications of the Electronic Health Card	176
	6.3.1	Overview	177
	6.3.2	Data Acquisition	
	6.3.3	Process Analysis	
	6.3.3	3.1 Actual Process	
	6.3.3	3.2 Process Groups	
	6.3.	3.3 Future Process with eHC	181
	6.3.4	Patient Survey	183
	6.3.4	4.1 Age Groups Analysis	184
	6.3.4	4.2 Usage Groups Analysis	186
	6.3.5	Summary	187

6.4 Analysis of a Proposed Solution for Managing Health Professional Cards	
in Hospitals Using a Single Sign-On Central Architecture	187
6.4.1 Overview	188
6.4.2 Induced Process Changes	189
6.4.2.1 General Changes	189
6.4.2.2 Discharge Letter Process	190
6.4.3 Existing Approaches for Managing Smart Cards in Hospitals	191
6.4.3.1 The Decentralized Approach	191
6.4.3.2 The VerSA Approach	191
6.4.3.3 Disadvantages	192
6.4.4 The Clinic Card Approach	192
6.4.4.1 Technical Architecture	193
6.4.4.2 Smart Card Management Unit	194
6.4.4.3 The Clinic Card and Card Middleware	194
6.4.4.4 Connector	195
6.4.4.5 Remote Access	195
6.4.4.6 Unique Characteristics of the Central Approach	196
6.4.4.7 Discharge Letter Process	197
6.4.5 Comparison of the Presented Approaches	198
6.4.5.1 Evaluation Framework	198
6.4.5.2 Hardware Requirements and Integration	198
6.4.5.3 Session Management	199
6.4.5.4 Usability	199
6.4.5.5 Further Value-Adding Aspects	200
6.4.6 Summary	200
6.5 Security Analysis of the German Electronic Health Card's Components on	201
a Theoretical Level	201
6.5.1 Overview	201
6.5.2 Components and Documents Considered in this Security Analysis	202
6.5.2.1 Security Analysis of the Electronic Health Card's Components	203
6.5.2.1.1 Cross-Component Analysis	203
6.5.2.1.2 Key for the Combination of Medical and Administrative Data	203
6.5.2.1.3 Unauthorized Transfer of Medical Data	203
6.5.2.1.4 Missing Backup Method for Honoring Prescriptions	203
6.5.2.1.5 Possibility to Honor the Same Prescription Twice	204
6.5.2.1.6 Unassigned Assumption About the Security Implied by the	
Used "Zone-Concept"	204

6.5.	2.1.7	Adjustment of Minimum Standards Happens Infrequently	204
6.5.	2.1.8	Inadequate Assumption About the Security of the Systems	
		Inside the Healthcare Telematics Infrastructure	205
6.5.	2.1.9	Security by Obscurity	205
6.5.2.2	2 Ana	alysis of the Connector	205
<sup>0</sup> 6.5 <sup>4</sup>	2.2.1	Imprecise Specification of the Blacklist Management	205
6.5.	2.2.2	Imprecise Specification of the Trusted Viewer Interface	206
6.5.	2.2.3	Security Issues Concerning the Communication with the	
*		Trusted Viewer	206
6.5.	2.2.4	Security Issues Concerning the Communication with the	
	~	Primary System	207
6.5.2.	3 Ana	alysis of the Primary System	208
6.5.	2.3.1	Insufficient Classification of the Processed Data	208
6.5.	2.3.2	Unassigned Assumption About the Presence of Security	
		Measures Provided by Present Primary Systems	208
6.5.	2.3.3	Analysis of the Card Reader	209
6.5.2.4	4 Ad	ditional Deficiencies Found During this Security Analysis	209
6.5.	2.4.1	Missing Specification for Services to Manage eHC Data by	
		the Insured	209
6.5.	.2.4.2	Missing Backup Processes for Essential Healthcare	
		Telematics Processes	
6.5.	2.4.3	Possibility of Health Insurance Number Readout by	
		Unauthorized Persons	
6.5.	.2.4.4	Logs for SMC Access on the Primary System May Not Be	
		Reliable	
6.5.	.2.4.5	Problematic Assumptions about the Environment of the	
		Medical Service Provider	
6.5.	.2.4.6	Insider Attacks from Medical Service Provider's Personnel	
		Not Considered in Threat Analysis	
6.5.	.2.4.7	Potential for an Attack on the Medical Service Provider's	
		LAN Considered As Too Low	
6.5.	.2.4.8	Missing Best-Practices Recommendations for Software Keys	
6.5.	.2.4.9	Missing Emergency Plans Regarding New Attacks on	
		Components and Cryptographic Methods	
6.5.3	Attack-	Tree Analysis	
6.5.4	Summa	ıry	

.

6.6 Security Analysis of the German Electronic Health Card's Peripheral Parts		
in Practice	213	
6.6.1 Overview	215	
6.6.2 Laboratory's / Physician's Practice Configuration	215	
6.6.3 Network Traffic Analyzes and its Consequences	217	
6.6.4 <sup>#</sup> Attacking the German Electronic Health Card	218	
6.6.4.1 Permanent-Card-Ejection	220	
6.6.4.2 Fill or Delete Prescriptions	220	
6.6.4.3 Block a Card's PIN	221	
6.6.4.4 Destroy a Card	222	
6.6.4.5 Spy Personal Information 6.6.5 Summary		
7 Appraisal of Results	227	
7.1 Overview	227	
7.2 Progress of Cognition	229	
7.3 Design Proposals for Healthcare Telematics	230	
Bibliography	233	
ppendix		