WORLD BANK STUDY

Electricity Auctions: An Overview of Efficient Practices

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Table of Contents

FO	DREWORD	vii
AC	CKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
EX	ECUTIVE SUMMARY	xi
1	Introduction	1
	Objectives of this Report	
	Approach	1
	Who Should Read This Report?	2
	Report Organization	2
2	Auctions—Basic Concepts	4
	What is an Auction?	4
	Why Auctions?	5
	Emergence of Auctions in the Power Sector: Historical Overview	5
	Auction Design	7
	Summary of Auction Designs	19
	Outcomes of Well-designed Auctions	20
	From Theory to Practice	20
	Auctions and World Bank Procurement Guidelines	20
	When Not to Use Auctions?	21
	If Not Auctions—What are the Alternative Procurement Mechanisms?	23
	Negotiations	23
3	Electricity Auctions: Experiences in Different Jurisdictions	27
	Introduction	27
	Classifying Country Experiences	27
4	Auctions in Latin America	31
	Brazil	31
	Colombia	36
	Chile	44
	Peru	48
	Panama	53
	Central America	54
	Mexico	56

5	Auctions in Asia, Oceania, Europe, North America, and Multi-Country	59
	Asia and Oceania	59
	Vietnam	59
	Philippines	60
	Thailand	61
	South Australia	61
	Europe	62
	North America	65
	Multi-country Auctions	73
6	Auctions and Renewable Energy Sources	77
	Overview: An Increasing Role for Renewables	77
	Feed-in-Tariffs and Other Mechanisms to Support Renewables	78
	Renewable Energy Auctions	80
	Site and Technology-specific Auctions	89
7	Main Lessons	95
	Auction-related Procurement and Energy Policy Aspects	95
	Market Context	
	Foundations for a Successful Auction	97
	General Auction Design Issues	98
	Technology Choice and Renewables	103
	Implementation Issues and Participants	103
8	Conclusions	107
APPENDIXES		109
	Appendix A-Electricity Procurement	111
	Appendix B—The Use of Auctions in the Electricity Industry	
	Appendix C—Virtual Power Plant Auctions Around the World	125
	Appendix D—Additional Experience with Renewables: FiTs and RPS	130
,	Appendix E—Issues Related to Descending Clock Auctions	137
	Appendix F – Approaches to Entertain Demand-Side Participation in Energy Auctions	139
	Appendix G—Competitive Electricity Procurement—Key Attributes	
GL.	OSSARY	
	FERENCES	
ΝĒ	I LINEINCEO	192
_	gures	
_	rure 2.1. Descending Auction Dynamics	
Fig	rure 2.2. Example of Hybrid Auction Dynamics	12