

## **Regulation and Banking after the Crisis**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Authors . . . . .	5
Preface . . . . .	7
<i>Frank Browne, David T. Llewellyn and Philip Molyneux</i>	
<b>1. Regulation and Banking after the Crisis . . . . .</b>	<b>9</b>
<i>Morten Balling and Ernest Gnan</i>	
<b>2. Banks and the Budget: Lessons from Europe . . . . .</b>	<b>19</b>
<i>Patrick Honohan</i>	
2.1. Two-way Channels of Influence Between Banks and the Budget – the Irish Example . . . . .	19
2.2. Other Recent European Examples of Banks Imposing Costs on the Budget . . . . .	24
2.3. From Budget to Banks . . . . .	26
<b>3. Post Crisis Regulatory Strategy: A Matrix Approach . . . . .</b>	<b>29</b>
<i>David T. Llewellyn</i>	
3.1. Some Key Issues . . . . .	29
3.2. Instruments in a Regulatory Regime . . . . .	32
3.3. Lowering the Probability of Bank Failures . . . . .	36
3.4. Minimising the Costs of Bank Failures . . . . .	46
3.5. Summary of the Argument: A Regulatory Strategy . . . . .	54
References . . . . .	56
<b>4. Strengthening the International Framework for Financial Regulation: Some Key Issues and Challenges . . . . .</b>	<b>61</b>
<i>Nigel Jenkinson</i>	
4.1. Introduction . . . . .	61
4.2. Strengthening the system-wide perspective . . . . .	62
4.3. Initiatives to Contain the Build Up of Risks . . . . .	66
4.4. Initiatives to Improve the Resilience to Stress . . . . .	68
4.5. Containing Moral Hazard and Managing Failure . . . . .	71
4.6. Challenges to the Design of the New Regulatory Framework	74
4.7. Conclusions . . . . .	77
References . . . . .	77

<b>5.</b>	<b>Risk Identification and Mitigation: Lessons from the Crisis. . . . .</b>	<b>79</b>
	<i>Aerdt Houben and Jan Kakes</i>	
	5.1. Introduction . . . . .	79
	5.2. Risk Identification and the Credit Crisis . . . . .	79
	5.3. Scope for Improvement . . . . .	83
	5.4. Concluding Remarks . . . . .	88
	References . . . . .	89
	Annex 1. Ambiguity in Risk Assessments: Pre-crisis Views on CRT	91
	Annex 2. Ambiguity in Risk Assessments: Initial Assessments of Lehman Collapse . . . . .	93
<b>6.</b>	<b>Banking as a Social Contract – The New Regulatory Paradigm. . .</b>	<b>95</b>
	<i>Pat Farrell</i>	
<b>7.</b>	<b>A False Sense of Security: Lessons from the Crisis for Bank Management and Regulators. . . . .</b>	<b>101</b>
	<i>Patricia Jackson</i>	
	7.1. Introduction . . . . .	101
	7.2. Lessons from the Crisis . . . . .	102
	7.3. Misleading Signals . . . . .	103
	7.4. Risk Governance and Incentives . . . . .	111
	7.5. Market Failure – Time Inconsistency and Incomplete Information . . . . .	113
	7.6. Conclusions . . . . .	114
	References . . . . .	115
<b>8.</b>	<b>Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk . . . . .</b>	<b>117</b>
	<i>Edward J. Kane</i>	
	8.1. When Do Risks Become Systemic? . . . . .	119
	8.2. Adverse Consequences of Misdiagnosing the Policy Problem	120
	8.3. Alternative Definitions of Systemic Risk Lead to Different Strategies of Regulatory Reform . . . . .	121
	8.4. Why Incentive Defects Persist . . . . .	123
	8.5. Steps that Government and Industry Could Take Toward Genuine Reform . . . . .	124
	8.6. Summary Implications . . . . .	130
	References . . . . .	131
<b>9.</b>	<b>The Case for Limited Liability Eurozone Government Debt . . . . .</b>	<b>133</b>
	<i>Alistair Milne</i>	
	9.1. Introduction . . . . .	133

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9.2. The Proposals .....	136
9.3. Does Monetary Union Require Fiscal Rules?.....	139
9.4. The Costs of Debt Restructuring: Need They Be so Large? .	142
9.5. Summary and Conclusion: The Euro Area Authorities Are Playing with Fire .....	144
References .....	146
<b>SUERF – Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières . .</b>	<b>147</b>
<b>SUERF Studies. ....</b>	<b>147</b>