## **Reforming Severance Pay**

## AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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## Contents

Pre	Pracexi
Ac	knowledgmentsxiii
Ab	breviationsxv
1.	Severance Pay under Review: Key Issues, Policy Conclusions, and Research Agenda
	References and Other Resources
2.	Severance Pay Programs around the World: History, Rationale, Status, and Reforms
	Introduction: Objectives, Methods, and Structure
	Annex C. Note on Econometric Estimation

3.	Mandated Severance Pay and Firing Cost Distortions:		
	A Critical Review of the Evidence	121	
	Donald O. Parsons		
	Introduction		
	Severance as Job Displacement Insurance: An Overview		
	Severance Policies and Outcomes: Theoretical Structure		
	Government Reforms: A Policy Taxonomy	129	
	An Early Cross-National Study: A Bold Empirical Adventure	131	
	Extending the Dismissal Policy Vector: Heckman-Pagés	132	
,	Employment Protection Legislation: OECD Studies	134	
	Labor Standards and Their Consequences	136	
	Broad Economic Reforms and Their Consequences	138	
	Employment Protection Legislation and Worker Separations	141	
	EPL: Employment and Its Distribution		
	EPL as Workplace Control		
	Severance Pay Generosity		
	Conclusion		
	Notes		
	References		
4.	The Firing Cost Implications of Alternative Severance		
	Pay Designs	159	
	Donald O. Parsons		
	Introduction		
	Job Separation Benefits: Some Definitions	160	
	Severance Insurance and Severance Savings: Consumption-Smoothing		
	and Firing Cost Consequences	162	
	Diversity of Severance Pay Plans in the United States:		
	Firing Cost Implications	163	
	Individual Programs as Elements of a Policy Bundle	168	
	Firing Costs: Some International Evidence		
	Conclusion		
	Notes	172	
	References	174	
5.	Effects of the Austrian Severance Pay Reform	1//	
	Helmut Hofer, Ulrich Schuh, and Dominik Walch		
	Introduction		
	Severance Pay Law in Austria		
	Capital Accumulation and the New Severance Pay Scheme		
	Mobility in the Labor Market		
	Conclusions		
	Notes		
	References	193	

6.	Severance Pay Reform in the Republic of Korea  Jungyoll Yun and Jai-Joon Hur	195	
	Introduction	195	
	The Corporate Pension System	197	
	Theoretical Framework	197	
	Policy Implications	203	
	Conclusion	206	
	Annex A	206	
	Notes	207	
	References	208	
7.	Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in		
	Latin America: Overview and Assessment	211	
	Introduction	211	
	Potential Advantages of UISAs		
	UISAs in Latin America		
	Outcomes of UISAs.		
	Conclusion		
	Notes		
	References and Other Resources		
8.	The Welfare Consequences of Alternative Designs		
	of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts	239	
	Hugo Hopenhayn and Juan Carlos Hatchondo		
	Introduction		
	Economic Environment		
	The Life-Cycle Model		
	Calibration		
	Benchmark and Other Mechanisms		
	Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts		
	Conclusions		
	Notes		
	References	25/	
9.	The New Chilean Unemployment Insurance System: Combining Individual Accounts and Redistribution		
	in an Emerging Economy	259	
	Solange Berstein, Eduardo Fajnzylber, and Pamela Gana		
	Introduction		
	Description of the System		
	Design Considerations and Reemployment Incentives		
	Evaluation	26/	

	The 2	009 Reform	272
	Lesso	ns for Other Countries	276
		lusions	
	Refere	ences	283
10.	. Reer	nployment Incentives under the Chilean Hybrid	
		mployment Benefit Program	285
		lo Reyes, Jan C. van Ours, and Milan Vodopivec	
		Quest to Reduce Work Disincentives in UI Programs	285
		and Methodology	
		ility and Use of the Solidarity Fund	
	_	rical Analysis of Job-Finding Rates	
		lusions	
		ences	
^-	و ما است	tors	005
Co	ntribu	lors	295
Во	xes		
	2.1	Railroad Workers and Severance Pay	19
	2.2	Severance Pay as Commitment Technology? An Early Example	
		of the Human Resource Management of Severance Pay	21
	2.3	Sri Lanka's Severance Pay System	
	2.4	Political Economy Complexities in Reforming Severance	_
		Pay Programs	44
	A.1	Golden Gate and Bay Bridges—Job Displacement and	
		Severance Pay	69
	A.2	Severance Pay in Mexico: Compensation for Liquidated	
		Damages of Job Ownership	72
		<i>5</i> , 1	
Fig	ures		
	2.1	Incidence of Mandated and Quasi-Mandated Severance	
		Pay Programs	
	2.2	Incidence of Mandated Severance Pay Programs in Sectors	
	2.3	Eligibility Contingencies for Severance Pay (in percent)	
	2.4	Vesting Periods for Benefit Eligibility (in months)	
	2.5	Severance Pay Generosity by Length of Service	
	2.6	Severance Pay Generosity Index	
	2.7	Funding Methods	
	2.8	Taxation Rules	
	2.9	Generosity of Severance Pay and per Capita GDP	
	2.10	Unemployment Benefit Generosity and per Capita GDP	
	2.11	Pension Benefit Generosity and per Capita GDP	
	2.12	Notice Period (in Weeks) and per Capita GDP	
	2.13	Generosity of Severance Pay versus Unemployment Benefit	
	2.14	Generosity of Severance Pay versus Pension Benefit Generosity	
	2.15	Severance Pay Generosity and Notice Period	57

	2.16	Severance Pay Generosity and Union Density58
	3.1	Mandated Severance Pay for Redundancy by Occupation
	3.2	Regulating Employment and Business Practices
	3.3	Percentage of Employers with Growth in Employment148
	4.1	Eligibility Conditions for Severance Pay, Total and by
		Organization Size
	5.1	Proportion of Employees Covered by the 2003
		Severance Pay Law
	5.2	Contributions to Austria's Severance Pay Scheme
	5.3	Performance of Severance Pay Funds
	5.4	Withdrawals from Employee Benefit Funds
	5.5	Job Duration Estimates, Female and Male
	7.1	Liquidity of FGTS220
	7.2	Financing the Chilean Unemployment System
	7.3	Colombian Severance Pay Fund Portfolio
	7.4	Rate of Return for Panama's Unemployment Funds228
	8.1	Pareto Set, low salary, baseline case
	8.2	Pareto Set, medium salary, baseline case
	8.3	Pareto Set, high salary, baseline case252
	8.4	Pareto Set, low salary
	8.5	Pareto Set, medium salary
	8.6	Pareto Set, high salary
	9.1	Unemployment Insurance Coverage
	9.2	Unemployment Insurance Program: Workers with
		Open-Ended Contracts
	9.3	Unemployment Insurance Program: Workers with
		Fixed-Term Contracts
	9.4	Contributors by Type of Contract and Wage Earners in
		the Private Sector, 2002–09 (number of contributors
		and number of workers)268
	9.5	Beneficiaries' Replacement Rates, 2002–June 2009269
	9.6	Unemployment Funds, Net Worth, 2002–June 2009270
	9.7	Estimated Median Benefit from the UI System,
		by Education and Age271
	9.8	Hazard Rates from Not Contributing, by Type of Benefit
		Received
	10.1	Exit Rates and Survival Rates, Prime-Age Males
	10.2	Exit Rates and Survival Rates, Prime-Age Female291
Tah	les	
IUL	2.1	Drivers of Generosity of Severance Pay: Results for
	2	Basic Model
	3.1	Expected Cost of Alternative Labor Market Mandates
	3.2	Estimated Impacts of Alternative Labor Market Mandates
	٠.٢	on Employment Levels
	4.1	Severance Benefit Generosity by Occupation, Organizations with Plan
	1.1	Based on Service Only

4.2	Basis of Severance Calculations by Occupation, Organizations	
	with Plan Not Based on Service Only	165
5.1	Simulations of the Severance Pay Funds	184
5.2	Job Tenure	185
5.3	Probability of Job Termination in Year 3 and Year 4	186
5.4	Probability of Job Termination by Gender in Year 3 and Year 4	187
5.5	Probability of Direct Job Change in Year 3 and Year 4	
5.6	Probit Difference-in-Differences: Dependent Variable,	
	Job Termination	188
5.7	Probit Difference-in-Differences: Dependent Variable,	
	Job Termination by Gender	189
5.8	Probit Difference-in-Differences: Dependent Variable,	
	Direct Job Change	189
5.9	Probit Difference-in-Differences: Dependent Variable,	
	Direct Job Change by Gender	190
5.10	Effect of Reform	191
6.1	Severance Pay System versus Corporate Pension System	198
6.2	Number of Workers under Corporate Pension System	
	as of November 2010	205
7.1	UISA Characteristics	216
7.2	FGTS, Number and Value of Accounts	219
7.3	Payments of Chilean Unemployment Insurance	222
7.4	Chilean Unemployment Fund	223
7.5	Evolution of the Colombian Fund	226
7.6	Severance Payments in Panama	
7.7	Composition of Panama's Unemployment Fund	228
7.8	Analysis of Funds	
8.1	Mean of Variables for Transitions from Employment to	
	Unemployment and Vice Versa	245
8.2	Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logistic Regressions	245
8.3	Cost of Insurance Mechanisms for Different Transfer Schemes	
	and Different Costs of Exerting Effort	247
8.4	Cost of Effort	
8.5	Marginal Cost of Effort in the Baseline Case	250
8.6	Marginal Cost of Effort for Alternative Designs	255
9.1	Valuation of Unemployment Insurance by Education Level	272
10.1	Eligibility and Use of the Solidarity Fund by Number of Potential	
	Withdrawals from the Individual Account	289