Frank Müller-Langer Creating R&D Incentives for Medicines for Neglected Diseases

An Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports, Patents, and Alternative Mechanisms to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Research

With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernd Schäfer



RESEARCH

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