

Game Practice and the Environment

Edited by

Carlo Carraro

*Professor of Econometrics and Environmental Economics,
University of Venice, Italy, Research Director, Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan and Venice, Italy*

Vito Fragnelli

*Professor of Game Theory, University of Eastern Piedmont,
Italy*

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