

Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

<i>List of Contributors</i>	<i>page xi</i>
Editors' Introduction	1
PART ONE. CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS AND TRANSITIONS	
1 Constitutional Problematics, circa 1787	41
<i>Jack N. Rakove</i>	
2 Inventing Constitutional Traditions: The Poverty of Fatalism	71
<i>James Johnson</i>	
3 The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution	110
<i>Lawrence G. Sager</i>	
PART TWO. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN	
4 Constitutional Democracy as a Two-Stage Game	147
<i>Jonathan Riley</i>	
5 Imagining Another Madisonian Republic	170
<i>Jonathan Riley</i>	
6 One and Three: Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution	205
<i>Pasquale Pasquino</i>	
7 A Political Theory of Federalism	223
<i>Jenna Bednar, William N. Eskridge Jr., and John Ferejohn</i>	
PART THREE. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY	
8 Designing an Amendment Process	271
<i>Sanford Levinson</i>	
9 Constitutional Theory Transformed	288
<i>Stephen M. Griffin</i>	

10 Constitutional Economic Transition	328
<i>Russell Hardin</i>	
11 Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation	361
<i>Jack Knight</i>	
<i>Name Index</i>	393
<i>Subject Index</i>	399