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Social Choice Mechanisms

With 8 Figures
and 2 Tables



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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
1. Basic Concepts	9
1.1 Preferences	9
1.2 Social Choice Correspondences	13
1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences	19
1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms	25
1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings	30
1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	35
1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs	37
1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs	40
Bibliographic Comments	43
2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms	45
2.1 Definitions and Examples	45
2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms	50
2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences	54
2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences	58
2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants	62
2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms	65
2.A A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria	68
Bibliographic Comments	70
3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms	73
3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle	73
3.2 Single-Peaked Environment	78
3.3 Linear Environment	85
3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms	92
3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms	97
3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case	105
3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment	106
Bibliographic Comments	108

4. Cores and Stable Blockings	111
4.1 Stable Outcomes.	111
4.2 Additive Blockings.	116
4.3 Convex Blockings.	122
4.4 Almost Additive Blockings.	125
4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions.	128
4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure.	132
4.A1 Balanced Blockings.	138
4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives.	140
4. A3 The Harems Lemma.	141
Bibliographic Comments.	142
5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms	145
5.1 Definitions and Examples.	145
5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism).	149
5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms.	153
5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms.	158
5.5 Laminable Blockings.	163
5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability.	168
5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings.	172
5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria.	175
Bibliographic Comments.	180
References	183
Index	189