

Nicola F. Maaser

---

# Decision-Making in Committees

Game-Theoretic Analysis

 Springer

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Games and Political Decisions</b> .....	1
1.1	Basic Concepts .....	2
1.1.1	The Characteristic Function .....	3
1.1.2	Simple Games .....	6
1.1.3	Spatial Analysis .....	12
1.2	Voting Rules and Power .....	16
1.2.1	Power Indices .....	16
1.2.2	Bargaining Power .....	25
1.2.3	Power Measurement and Spatial Voting .....	29
1.3	Voting Rules and Payoffs .....	35
<b>2</b>	<b>Committees as Representative Institutions</b> .....	41
2.1	Criteria for Representative Committees .....	42
2.2	The Model .....	46
2.3	Analytic Arguments .....	50
2.4	Simulation Results .....	55
2.4.1	Randomly Generated Configurations .....	57
2.4.2	EU Council of Ministers .....	61
2.4.3	US Electoral College .....	64
2.5	Discussion .....	65
<b>3</b>	<b>Robust Equal Representation</b> .....	69
3.1	Simple and Sophisticated Square Root Rules .....	70
3.2	Quota Variation .....	74
3.2.1	The ‘Optimal’ Quota .....	74
3.2.2	Supermajorities and Representation .....	76
3.3	Heterogeneity Across Constituencies .....	81
3.4	Discussion .....	90

<b>4 Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation</b> .....	95
4.1 Motivation .....	96
4.2 The Model .....	99
4.2.1 The Legislature .....	99
4.2.2 The Lobbyists' Game .....	101
4.3 Analysis of the Model .....	103
4.3.1 Legislative Decision-Making Without Lobbyists .....	103
4.3.2 Lobbyists' Contributions .....	104
4.3.3 Cartel Formation and Small Status Quo Bias .....	105
4.3.4 Cartel Formation and Large Status Quo Bias .....	108
4.4 Discussion .....	113
<b>References</b> .....	119